THE LOCATION OF CULTURE
which qualities of dynamism, of growth, of depth can be recognised. As against this, [in colonial cultures] we find characteristics, curiosities, things, never a structure. 22

OF MIMICRY AND MAN
The ambivalence of colonial discourse

Mimicry reveals something in so far as it is distinct from what might be called an itself that is behind. The effect of mimicry is camouflage. It is not a question of harmonizing with the background, but against a mottled background, of becoming mottled - exactly like the technique of camouflage practiced in human warfare.


It is out of season to question at this time of day, the original policy of a conferring on every colony of the British Empire a mimic representation of the British Constitution. But if the creature so endowed has sometimes forgotten its real significance and under the fancied importance of speakers and names, and all the paraphernalia and ceremonies of the imperial legislature, has dared to defy the mother country, she has to thank herself for the folly of conferring such privileges on a condition of society that has no earthly claim to so exalted a position. A fundamental principle appears to have been forgotten or overlooked in our system of colonial policy - that of colonial dependence. To give to a colony the forms of independence is a mockery; she would not be a colony for a single hour if she could maintain an independent station.

Sir Edward Curtis, 'Reflections on West African affairs... addressed to the Colonial Office', Hatchard, London 1859

The discourse of post-Enlightenment English colonialism often speaks in a tongue that is forked, not false. If colonialism takes power in the name of history, it repeatedly exercises its authority through the figures of force. For the epic intention of the civilizing mission, 'human and not wholly human' in the famous words of Lord Rosebery, 'write by the finger of the Divine' often produces a text rich in the traditions of montage, irony, mimicry and repetition. In this comic turn from the high ideals of the colonial imagination to its low mimetic literary effects mimicry emerges as one of the most elusive and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge.

Within that confessional economy of colonial discourse which Edward
THE LOCATION OF CULTURE

Sayd describes the tension between the synchronic panoptical vision of domination – the demand for identity, status – and the countervailing pressure of the disunity of history – change. Difference – mimicry represents an ironic compromise. If I may adapt Samuel Weber’s formulation of the marginalising vision of castration, then colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is ‘almost the same, but not quite’. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference. The authority of that mode of colonial discourse that I have called mimicry is therefore stricken by an indeterminacy: mimicry emerges as the representation of a difference that is itself a process of disavowal. Mimicry is, thus the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which ‘appropriates’ the Other as it visualizes power. Mimicry is also the sign of the inappropriate, however, a difference or recalcitrance which coheres the dominant strategic function of colonial power, intensifies surveillance, and poses an immediate threat to both ‘normalized’ knowledges and disciplinary powers.

The effect of mimicry on the authority of colonial discourse is profound and disturbing. For in ‘normalizing’ the colonial state or subject, the dream of post-Enlightenment civilization alienates its own language of liberty and produces another knowledge of its norms. The ambivalence which thus informs this strategy is discernible, for example, in Locke’s Second Treatise which spins to reveal the limitations of liberty in his double use of the word ‘slave’: fast simply, descriptively as the locus of a legitimate form of ownership, then as the tropes for an intolerable, illegitimate exercise of power. What is articulated in that distance between the two uses is the absolute, imagined difference between the ‘Colonial’ State of Carolina and the Original State of Nature.

It is from this area between mimicry and mockery, where the reforming, civilizing mission is threatened by the displacing gaze of its disciplinary desire, that any instances of colonial imitation come. What they all share is a discursive process by which the excess or slippage produced by the ambivalence of mimicry (almost the same, but not quite) does not merely ‘replace’ the discourse, but becomes transformed into an uncertainty which fixes the colonial subject as a ‘partial’ presence. By ‘partial’ I mean both ‘incomplete’ and ‘virtual’. It is as if the very emergence of the ‘colonial’ is dependent for its representation upon some strategic insinuation or protrusion within the authoritative discourse itself. The success of colonial appropriation depends upon a proliferation of inappropriate objects that ensure its strategic failure, so that mimicry is at once assimilation and resistance.

A classic text of such partiality is Charles Grant’s ‘Observations on the State of Society among the Asiatic Subjects of Great Britain’ (1792)

OF MIMICRY AND MAN

which was only superseded by James Mill’s History of India as the most influential early nineteenth-century account of Indian manners and morals. Grant’s dream of an evangelical system of mission education conducted uncompromisingly in the English language, was partly a belief in political reform along Christian lines and partly an awareness that the expansion of company rule in India required a system of subject formation – a reform of manners. As Grant put it – that would provide the colonial with ‘a sense of personal identity as we know it’. Caught between the desire for religious reform and the fear that the Indians might become turbulent for liberty, Grant paradoxically implies that it is the ‘partial’ diffusion of Christianity, and the ‘partial’ influence of moral improvements which will construct a particularly appropriate form of colonial subjectivity. What is suggested is a process of reform through which Christian doctrines might collude with divisive caste practices to prevent dangerous political alliances. Inadvertently, Grant produces a knowledge of Christianity as a form of social control which conflicts with the emancipatory assumptions that authorize his discourse.

In suggesting, finally, that ‘partial reform’ will produce an empty form of ‘the imitation [my emphasis] of English manners which will induce them [the colonial subjects] to remain under our protection.’ Grant mocks his moral project which violates the Evidence of Christianity – a central missionary tenet – which forbade any tolerance of heathen faiths.

The absurd extravagance of Macaulay’s ‘Minute’ (1835) – deeply influenced by Charles Grant’s ‘Observations’ – makes a mockery of Oriental learning until faced with the challenge of conceiving of a ‘reformed’ colonial subject. Then, the great tradition of European humanism seems capable only of ironizing itself. At the intersection of European learning and colonial power, Macaulay can conceive of nothing other than ‘a class of interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern – a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect’. In other words a mimic man raised ‘through our English Schools, as a missionary educator’ wrote in 1819, ‘to form a corps of translators and be employed in different departments of Labour’. The line of descent of the mimic man can be traced through the works of Kipling, Forster, Orwell, Naipaul, and to his emergence, most recently, in Benedict Anderson’s excellent work on nationalism, as the anomalous Bipin Chandra Pal. He is the effect of a flawed colonial mimicry, in which to be Anglicized is emphasized not to be English.

The figure of mimicry is locatable within what Anderson describes as ‘the inner compatibility of empire and nation’. It problematizes the signs of racial and cultural priority, so that the ‘national’ is no longer naturalizable. What emerges between mimicry and mimicry is a turning, a mode of representation, that amalgamizes the monumentality of
The Location of Culture

history, quite simply mocks its power to be a model, that power which supposedly makes it imitable. Mimicry repeats rather than re-presents and in that disguising perspective emerges Decoud’s displaced European vision of Sulaco in Conrad’s Nostromo as:

the endlessness of civil strife where folly seemed even harder to bear than its ignominy ... the lawlessness of a populace of all colours and races, barbarism, intolerable tyranny, ... America is ungovernable.11

Or Ralph Singh’s apostasy in Naipaul’s The Mimic Men:

We pretended to be real, to be learning, to be preparing ourselves for life, we mimic men of the New World, one unknown corner of it, with all its reminders of the corruption that came so quickly to the new.12

Both Decoud and Singh, and in their different ways Grant and Macaulay, are the paradigm of history. Despite their intentions and invocations they enunciate the colonial text erratically, eccentrically across a body politic that refuses to be representative, in a narrative that refuses to be representational. The desire to emerge as ‘authentic’ through mimicry — through a process of writing and repetition — is the final irony of partial representation.

What I have called mimicry is not the familiar exercise of dependent colonial relations through narcissistic identification so that, as Fanon has observed, the black man stops being an actional person for only the white man can represent his self-esteem. Mimicry conceals no presence or identity behind its mask: it is not what Claire describes as ‘colonization-désinscription’ behind which stands the essence of the present African. The mirror of mimicry is its double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts its authority. And it is a double vision that is a result of what I’ve described as the partial recognition/representation of the colonial object. Grant’s colonial as partial mediator, Macaulay’s translator, Naipaul’s colonial politician as play-actor, Decoud as the scene setter of the opera bouffe of the New World, these are the appropriate objects of a colonialist chain of command, authorized versions of otherness. But they are also, as I have shown, the figures of a doubling, the part-objects of a metonymy of colonial desires which affirms the modality and normality of those dominant discourses in which they emerge as ‘inappropriate’ colonial subjects. A desire that, through the repetition of partial presence, which is the basis of mimicry, articulates those disturbances of cultural, racial and historical difference that interface the narcissistic demand of colonial authority. It is a desire that renews ‘in part’ the colonial appropriation by now producing a partial vision of the colonizer’s presence: a gaze

of otherness, that shares the acuity of the genealogical gaze which, as Foucault describes it, liberates marginal elements and shatters the unity of man’s being through which he extends his sovereignty.13

I want to turn to this process by which the look of surveillance returns as the displacing gaze of the disciplined, where the observer becomes the observed and ‘partial’ representation rearticulates the whole notion of identity and alienates it from essence. But not before observing that even an exemplary history like Eric Stokes’s The English Utilitarians and India acknowledges the anomalous gaze of otherness but finally disavows it in a contradictory utterance:

Certainly India played no central part in fashioning the distinctive qualities of English civilization. In many ways it acted as a disturbing force, a magnetic power placed at the periphery tending to distort the natural development of Britain’s character.14 (My emphasis)

What is the nature of the hidden thrust of the partial gaze? How does mimicry emerge as the subject of the scopic drive and the object of colonial surveillance? How is desire disciplined, authority displaced?

If we turn to a Freudian figure to address these issues of colonial textuality, that form of difference that is mimicry — almost the same but not quite — will become clear. Writing of the partial nature of fantasy, caught inappropriately between the unconscious and the precocious, making problematic, like mimicry, the very notion of ‘origins’, Freud has this to say:

Their mixed and split origin is what decides their fate. We may compare them with individuals of mixed race who take all round resemblance white men but who betray their coloured descent by some striking feature or other and on that account are excluded from society and enjoy none of the privileges.15

Almost the same but not quite: the visibility of mimicry is always produced at the site of interdiction. It is a form of colonial discourse that is uttered in the dark: a discourse at the crossroads of what is known and permissible and that which though known must be kept concealed; a discourse uttered between the lines and as such both against the rules and within them. The question of the representation of difference is therefore always also a problem of authority. The ‘desire’ of mimicry, which is Foucault’s ‘striking feature’ that reveals so little but makes such a big difference, is not merely that imposibility of the Other which repeatedly resists signification. The desire of colonial mimicry — an interdicted desire — may not have an object, but it has strategic objectives which I shall call the metonymy of presence.

Those inappropriate signifiers of colonial discourse — the difference
between being English and being Anglicized; the identity between stereotypes which, through repetition, also become different; the discriminatory identities constructed across traditional cultural norms and classifications, the Samian Black, the Lyng, Asiatic — all these are metonymies of presence. They are strategies of desire in discourse that make the anomalous representation of the colonized something other than a process of 'the return of the repressed'. What Fanon unsatisfactorily characterized as collective catharsis, 18 These instances of metonymy are the non-repressive productions of contradictory and multiple belief. They cross the boundaries of the culture of enunciation through a strategic confusion of the metaphorical and metonymic axes of the cultural production of meaning.

In mimicry, the representation of identity and meaning is recirculated along the axis of metonymy. As Lacan reminds us, mimicry is like camouflage, not a harmonization of repression of difference, but a form of resemblance, that differs from or defends presence by displaying it in part, metaphorically. Its threat, I would add, comes from the pre-digious and strategic production of conflictual, fantastic, discriminatory 'identity effects' in the play of a power that is elusive because it hides no essence, no 'itself'. And that form of resemblance is the most terrifying thing to behold, as Edward Long testifies in his History of Jamaica (1774). At the end of a tortured, neoglyphic passage, that shifts paradoxically between petty, prevarication and perversion, the text finally confronts its fear, nothing other than the repetition of its resemblance 'in part': 'Negros' are represented by all authors as the vilest of human kind, to which they have little more pretense of resemblance than what arises from their exterior forms' (my emphasis). 19

From such a colonial encounter between the white presence and its black semblance, there emerges the question of the ambivalence of mimicry as a problematic of colonial subjection. For, if Sade's scandalous theatricalization of language repeatedly reminds us that discourse can claim 'no priority', then the work of Edward Said will not let us forget that the 'ethnocentric and erratic will to power from which texts come springing' 20 is itself a theatre of war. Mimicry, as the metonymy of presence, indeed, such an erratic, eccentric strategy of authority in colonial discourse. Mimicry does not merely destroy narcissistic authority through the repetitious slippage of difference and desire. It is the process of the fiction of the colonial as a form of cross-classificatory, discriminatory knowledge within an interdictory discourse, and therefore necessarily raises the question of the authorizations of colonial representations: a question of authority that goes beyond the subject's lack of priority (constituted by a historical crisis in the conceptuality of colonial mass as an object of regulatory power, as the subject of racial, cultural, national representations.

OF MIMICRY AND MAN

'This culture . . . fixed in its colonial status'. Fanon suggests, 'is both present and ossified, it testified against its members. It defines them in fact without appeal.' 21 The ambivalence of mimicry — almost but not quite — suggests that the fetishized colonial culture is potentially and strategically an insurgent counter-apparatus. What I have called its 'identity-effects' are always crucially split. Under cover of camouflage, mimicry, like the fetish, is a part-object that radically revalues the normative knowledges of the priority of race, writing, history. For the fetish munificently abandons the forms of authority at the point at which it deauthorizes them. Similarly, mimicry rearticulates presence in terms of its 'otherness', that which it disavows. There is a crucial difference between this colonial articulation of man and his doubles and that which Foucault describes as 'thinking the unthought' 22 which, for nineteenth-century Europe, is the ending of man's alienation by reconciling him with his essence. The colonial discourse that articulates an interdictory otherness is precisely the 'other scene' of this nineteenth-century European desire for an authentic historical consciousness.

The 'unthought' across which colonial man is articulated is that process of classificatory confusion that I have described as the metonymy of the substitutive chain of ethical and cultural discourse. This results in the splitting of colonial discourse so that two attitudes towards external reality persist; one takes reality into consideration while the other disavows it and replaces it by a product of desire that repeats, rearticulates 'reality' as mimicry.

So Edward Long can say with authority, quoting variously Hume, Eastwick and Bishop Warburton in his support, that: 'Ludicrous as the opinion may seem I do not think that an orangutang husband would be any dishonour to a Florentine female'.

Such contradictory articulations of reality and desire — seen in racist stereotypes, statements, jokes, myths — are not caught in the doubtful circle of the return of the repressed. They are the effects of a disavowal that denies the differences of the other but produces in its stead forms of authority and multiple belief that alienate the assumptions of 'civil' discourse. If, for a while, the rule of desire is calculable for the uses of discipline soon the repetition of guilt, justification, pseudo-scientific theories, superstition, spurious authorities, and classifications can be seen as the desperate effort to 'normalize' formally the disturbance of a discourse of splitting that violates the rational, enlightened claims of its enunciatory modality. The ambivalence of colonial authority repeatedly turns from mimicry — a difference that is almost nothing but not quite — to distance — a difference that is almost total but not quite. And in that other scene of colonial power, where history turns to face and presence to 'a part' can be seen the twin figures of narcissism and paranoia that repeat furiously, uncontrollably.
THE LOCATION OF CULTURE

In the ambivalent world of the 'not quite/not white', on the margins of metropolitan desire, the foundling objects of the Western world become the exotic, eccentric, accidental objects trouvé of the colonial discourse — the part-objects of presence. It is then that the body and the book lose their part-objects of presence. It is then that the body and the book lose their representational authority. Black skin splits under the racist gaze, displaced into signs of bestiality, genitalia, grotesquerie, which reveal the pithy myth of the undifferentiated whole white body. And the holiest of books — the Bible — bearing both the standard of the cross and the standard of empire finds itself strangely dismembered. In May 1817 a missionary wrote from Bengal:

Still everyone would gladly receive a Bible. And why? — that he may lay it up as a curiosity for a few pice; or use it for waste paper. Such it is well known has been the common fate of these copies of the Bible.... Some have been bartered in the markets, others have been thrown in snuff shops and used as wrapping paper.24

5

SLY CIVILITY

They [the paranoic], too, cannot regard anything in other people as indifferent, and they, too, take up minute indications with which these other, unknown, people present them, and use them in their 'delusions of reference'. The awnting of these delusions of reference is that they expect from all strangers something like love. But these people show them nothing of the kind; they laugh to themselves, flourish their stocks, even spit on the ground as they go by — and one really does not do such things while a person in whom one takes a friendly interest is near. One does them only when one feels quite indifferent to the passer-by, when one can treat him like air; and, considering, too, the fundamental kinship of the concepts of 'stranger' and 'enemy', the paranoic is not so far wrong in regarding this indifference as hate, in contrast to his claim for love.
Freud, 'Some neurotic mechanisms in jealousy, paranoia and homosexuality'3

If the spirit of the Western nation has been symbolized in epic and anthem, voiced by a 'unanimous people assembled in the self-presence of its speech', then the sign of colonial government is cast in a lower key, caught in the irredeemable act of writing. Who better to bear witness to this hypothesis than that representative figure of the mid-nineteenth century, J. S. Mill, who divided his life between addressing the colonial sphere as an examiner of correspondence for the East India Company, and preaching the principles of postutilitarian liberalism to the English nation.

'The whole government of India is carried out in writing,' Mill testified to a Select Committee of the House of Lords in 1852.

All the orders given and all the acts of executive officers are reported in writing.... [These] is no single act done in India, the whole of the reasons for which are not placed on record. This appears to me a greater security for good government than exists in almost any other government in the world, because no other has a system of recordation so complete.'